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Tentative Estimate of Possible Soviet Strategic Analysis

1. Soviets probably believe that U.S. Military Power is vastly superior to that of the USSR.
2. The Soviets have two courses of action to protect themselves from this disproportion of power:
 - a. ~~Use~~ Western Europe as a hostage.
 - b. Develop their own deterrent in the form of nuclear weapons and delivery systems which, although not balancing U.S. capability still are sufficiently strong to deter a U.S. attack.
3. They recognize that as long as Germany is kept weak that Western Europe is less and less important as a hostage - that is, it is less and less likely to affect outcome of a war.
4. They also recognize that as long as W.E. has no nuclear capability of its own it can be used as a hostage to the Soviet ~~nuclear~~ capability and that conventional forces therefore are largely unnecessary for this purpose.
5. The Soviets don't intend to gamble on a surprise attack and recognizing U.S. superiority don't intend to start a war of any kind which could result in nuclear war with the U.S.
6. Having achieved a deterrent capability they would like to stop the arms race before military power becomes even more disproportionate.
7. Their main objectives therefore are to stop U.S. production of nuclear weapons, stop spread of nuclear weapons to other enemy countries, assure neutralization of Germany and get some sort of moral or political commitment from the U.S. that we will not use our nuclear superiority. They ~~probably~~ recognize that we would not destroy stocks of weapons and that although desirable, this is an impossible goal. They are probably prepared, therefore, to let us keep nuclear weapons as long as we give moral commitment not to use them.

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8. If they could do these things and retain sufficient freedom to continue to improve their delivery systems, they would regard an agreement as major achievement.
9. They would be content with freezing U.S. nuclear power under a moral commitment because they do not intend to fight a war and intend to continue the struggle in political and economic fields where moral commitment would neutralize our use of nuclear capability as a political weapon.

The above suggests that USSR must have:

- a. Test ban or other agreement to stop production of nuclear weapons throughout the world.
- b. Moral commitment not to use nuclear weapons.
- c. Assured neutralization of Germany.

It also suggests that in return for these things U.S. must retain present nuclear capability and freeze improvement in Soviet delivery systems:

- a. Missiles
- b. Long range aircraft
- c. Submarines

Both sides would benefit from safeguards against surprise attack.

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